• Newly public data: Patent RETech and Breadth through 2018 are now available!
• “Rapidly Evolving Technologies and Startup Exits” is now accepted at Management Science!

Rapidly Evolving Technologies and Startup Exits (with Gerard Hoberg and Laurent Fresard)

(SSRN Link) (Official link) (Replication kits: analysis and measure construction) (Plug and play data for researchers!)

Media: Tuck Forum on Private Equity and Venture Capital

Forthcoming at Management Science

Formerly titled “Technological Disruptiveness and the Evolution of IPOs and Sell-Outs”

This paper examines startups’ positioning within technological cycles. We use patent text to measure whether innovation pertains to a technological area that is rapidly evolving or stable. We show that innovation in rapidly evolving areas (i.e., early in the cycle) substitute for existing technologies, whereas innovation in stable areas (i.e., later in the cycle) complement them. Our new measure is distinct from existing characterizations of innovation and is economically important. We find that startups in rapidly evolving areas tend to exit via IPO, thus remaining independent, consistent with technological substitution. In contrast, startups in stable areas tend to sell-out, consistent with technological complementarity and synergies.

What’s your identification strategy? Innovation in corporate finance research (with Laurent Fresard and Jerome Taillard)

Management Science (2017) 63(8): 2529-2548

(SSRN link) (Official link) (Data and replication code/kit)

We study the diffusion of techniques designed to identify causal relationships in corporate finance research. We estimate the diffusion started in the mid-nineties, lags twenty years compared to economics, and is now used in the majority of corporate finance articles. Consistent with recent theories of technology diffusion, the adoption varies across researchers based on individuals’ expected net benefits of adoption. Younger scholars, holders of PhDs in economics, and those working at top institutions adopt faster. Adoption is accelerated through networks of colleagues and alumni and is also facilitated by straddlers who cross-over from economics to finance. Our findings highlight new forces that explain the diffusion of innovation and shape the norms of academic research.

Patent acquisition, investment, and contracting

(SSRN link)

Best Paper in Innovation and Entrepreneurship from the Ed Snider Center for Entrepreneurship and Markets, 2017

Numerous works have examined the finance-related implications of intellectual property that is generated internally or acquired through M&A activity. The transfer of intellectual property via the secondary market for patents has received less attention. This paper fills that gap by asking how patent acquisitions interact with firm investment policy. I find that patent acquirers subsequently invest in more R&D, increase internal patenting, and eventually make new investments in CAPX. Firms with more technological expertise and investment opportunities acquire more patents. Patent sales are the dominant type of contract and maximize investment incentives; patent licenses frequently contain royalties, which induce underinvestment problems. Nevertheless, licensing can be explained in part by financial and strategic considerations. Licensing is more likely when buyers become financially constrained, when revenue can be shifted to low tax sellers, and when the buyer is a competitor acquiring rights to a valuable patent. Overall, these results suggest patent acquisitions are motivated by the pursuit of investment synergies, rather than innovation substitution, commercialization motives, or legal threats.

Were non-independent boards really captured before SOX?

(SSRN link)

Media mentions: Columbia Law School’s Blue Sky Blog

Following SOX, exchanges mandated majority independent boards and defined independence such that some directors could reclassify from non-independent to independent. Because membership is unchanged, reclassifications make a board more independent legally, but not economically. I exploit the plausibly exogenous nature of reclassification eligibility to compare “treatment” firms that altered board membership to similar “placebo” firms that reclassified directors instead. Consistent with the view that boards are chosen optimally, placebo firms outperformed treatment firms by 3.7%. Furthermore, the mandate, which reduced firm specific knowledge as inside directors departed, also impacted investment choices: Treatment firms subsequently shifted away from intangible investments.